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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
By way of summation, the general rule is that an overruling
decision is to be given retroactive effect; that exceptions to this
rule exist where contract or property rights have vested, where
a statutory or constitutional provision is being construed, where
personal rights in criminal cases are involved. The Sunburst de-
cision is the leading case in the growing equitable tendency to-
ward granting prospective effect only. The chief obstacle to
general acceptance of the Montana Doctrine still seems to be the
declaratory theory that a judge declares not makes law. This
the courts still feel themselves bound to follow despite the harsh
results often engendered and despite the fact that the Sunburst
case indicates that there is no constitutional objection nor com-
mon law limitation on the power of courts to grant either retro-
active or prospective application. Since there are instances
when retroactive effect is called for, the determination of which
is to be based on the "principle of reliance," it would seem that
in the interest of doing effective justice the general rule ought
to be prospective overruling, with retroactive overruling the ex-
ception.
Existing in four broad categories of (1) constitutional and
statutory construction, (2) vested contract and property rights,
(3) procedure, and (4) torts, is a guide by which courts can be
aided in developing this new judicial technique. Eventually in
each category, situations of justifiable reliance will be indicated
and ultimately can be listed in an ascending-descending degree of
importance. But this determination of the effect to be given an
overruling decision, lying so peculiarly within the power and
abilities of the courts, is a task and a duty which ought not to be
shunted to the legislature.
LAWRENCE G. STIMATZ
TRUST OR DEBT?
A REVIEW OF MONTANA DECISIONS
Courts have not consistently answered the question of
whether a given transaction creates a trust or a debt. A trust
and a debt are fundamentally different, and it is important to
distinguish between them where the claimant is seeking a prefer-
ence.
In some cases courts have disregarded the distinctions be-
common law having been evolved in a process of application of rules
to particular cases, has a ... fitness to the actualities of life that no
body of legislative rules made in a priori fashion can have."-Carpen-
ter, supra, n. 43 at p. 63.
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tween a bailment and a trust and used the term "trust" gen-
erally. Sometimes a trust is spoken of as a principal-agent rela-
tionship.! Whatever the term used, if the plaintiff can show that
(1) the transaction created a fiduciary relationship, as distin-
guished from a creditor and debtor relationship, thus making the
defendant a trustee for the benefit of the plaintiff, (2) that by
the transaction the defendant's assets were augmented, and (3)
that the trust funds can be traced into the possession of the de-
fendant, he will get a preference on his claim.'
The Montana court has had many opportunities to consider
this problem. Has the court been consistent in its treatment
of the cases ? In State v. Karri,' the defendant saloon keeper per-
suaded a liquor dealer to advance him $1,000 in order to cash
miners' pay checks and thereby sell more drinks. Instead of
cashing the miners' pay checks, the defendant used the $1,000 to
pay some pressing creditors. When the defendant did not repay
on the date agreed, the liquor dealer preferred charges of grand
larceny, claiming the defendant was a bailee of the $1,000 for
the purpose of cashing miners' pay checks. The court held the
transaction a mere loan for exchange, and the retailer was not
guilty of larceny. This case was correctly decided. The retailer
had title to the $1,000 as well as the beneficial interest; his obliga-
tion was to repay at a future date; and he assumed no position
of trust or confidence with relation to the $1,000 borrowed nor
to the checks cashed for the miners. It was a loan in which the
defendant contracted to use the money borrowed for a specific
purpose.
The great majority of cases involving a trust or debt ques-
tion, however, arise in the field of banks and banking. In these
cases, the plaintiff is usually attempting to classify his deposit
as a special deposit. If he succeeds, he gets a preference over
'Continental & Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v. Chicago Title &
Trust Co., 118 C.C.A. 142, 199 F. 704 (1912) ; (The court speaks of sub-
ject matter as a bailment and a trust) ; Fogg v. Tyler, 109 Me. 109, 82
A. 1008 (1912) ; (The court used the term trustee-trustor as well as
bailee-bailor).
"California Packing Corporation v. McClintock, 75 Mont. 72, 241 P. 1077
(1925) ; Keyes v. Paducah & I.R. Co., 61 F. (2d) 611, 86 A.L.R. 203
(1932).
'Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Browne, 69 Mont. 140, 220 P. 1114 (1922);
McDonald v. American Bank & Trust Co., 79 Mont. 233, 255 P. 733
(1927) ; Powell Building & Loan Asociation v. Larabie Brothers Bank-
ers, Inc., 100 Mont. 183, 46 P. (2d) 697 (1935).
'51 Mont. 157; 149 P. 856 (1915).
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 13 [1952], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol13/iss1/9
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
the general creditors of the bank.' General depositors are con-
sidered as general creditors and are not allowed a preference.'
A special deposit is one in which the money, chattel, or se-
curities are deposited with the understanding that the identical
money or chattel is to be returned to the depositor.' For exam-
ple, if the bank gratuitously takes bonds from a depositor for
safekeeping and they are stolen or lost, the bank, if liable at all,
will be liable on principles of bailment.' This is a true special
deposit, since the identical thing deposited is to be returned.
Also, if the bank is asked to buy a note for the depositor and
hold it for him after it has purchased the note, the bank will be
considered as holding the note in trust for the depositor."
Another type of deposit which has not been too well recog-
nized is the general deposit for a specific purpose. This type, as
the term indicates, results when a deposit is made with the bank
undertaking an obligation other than the honoring of checks
drawn by the depositor.m ' However, it has been held that in a
general deposit for a specific purpose the exact money deposited
need not be used, but an equivalent fund will be satisfactory.'
Courts in the past have not distinguished between a special de-
posit and a general deposit for a specific purpose, but have inter-
preted them as having the same legal affect. Today there is a
noticeable trend to distinguish the general deposit for a specific
purpose.' The Montana Supreme Court has said, "If a deposit
is authorized, it must be either general or special, for there is no
other kind of deposit.. . . "' With respect to the status of claim-
ants it is felt that our court should recognize that a general de-
posit for a specific purpose is similar to a general deposit for
checking purposes. In a general deposit for a specific purpose
the bank may consent to pay a note for the depositor, take up a
mortgage for him, or release the depositor from some other ob-
'Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Browne, supra, note 5; McDonald v. Ameri-
can Bank & Trust Company, supra, note 5.
'Rohr v. Stanton, 76 Mont. 248, 245 P. 947 (1926) ; Raban v. Cascade
Bank, 33 Mont. 413, 84 P. 72 (1906) ; Pethybridge v. First State Bank
of Livingston, 75 Mont. 173, 243 P. 569 (1926).
'Boyd v. Harrison State Bank, supra, note 7.
State v. Farmers' & Mechanics' State Bank of Helena, 85 Mont. 265,
278 P. 520 (1920) ; Fogg v. Tyler, supra, note 1; ScoTT ON TRUSTS, § 530.
'Boyd v. Harrison State Bank, Supra, Note 7.
'State v. Farmers' & Mechanics' State Bank of Helena, 8upra, note 7.
'
0Scoar ON TRUSTS, § 530, (1939).
"MORsE, BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed. 1928) § 210.
22Santee Timber Corp. v. William Elliott, 70 F(2) 179, 93 A.L.R. 874
(1934) ; ScOTT oN TRUSTS, § 530.
'2Montana-Dakota Power Company v. Johnson, 95 Mont. 16, 23 P. (2d)
956 (1933) ; Pethybridge v. First State Bank of Livingston, 75 Mont.
173; 243 P. 569 (1926).
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ligation owing to a third party by paying that third party. If
the depositor intends to retain the beneficial interest in the
money, he is entitled to the funds deposited in event of the
bank's failure. However, if the parties intend that the bank is
to consider the money as its own, the transaction takes on the
nature of a general deposit. The modern trend where money is
deposited with instructions to transmit it to another party is to
treat it as a debt.1'
A deposit is ordinarily presumed to be general;' therefore to
secure a preference a party has the burden of proving that a
special deposit was intended. Since recovery of preferred claims
from insolvent banks is generally regarded as based upon some
theory of trusts," the courts have applied trust principles to de-
termine the intention of depositors.
A deposit of trust funds by a trustee with the bank's'knowl-
edge that they are trust funds does not of itself make the deposit
a special one so as to entitle the depositor to a priority over the
general creditors if the bank becomes insolvent." But if a de-
positor deposits money "in trust" to the bank, courts have had
trouble determining what kind of a relationship was established.
In Conley v. Johnson one Clark from Butte deposited $25,000
with the Larabie Brothers, Bankers of Deer Lodge, "in trust" to
the end that the bank was to pay 4% interest to two individuals
who were to receive the interest in trust and apply the same for
the use and benefit of the state prison band. The court allowed
a preference, relying almost entirely upon the wording of the
agreement: "The sum of $25,000 was given in trust to the bank
in very plain and explicit terms . . ."; and that the relation of
debtor and creditor was a "very different relation from that de-
scribed by the words of the contract." Chief Justice Sands dis.
sented, maintaining that the agreement merely set up a debtor-
creditor relationship.
Chief Justice Sands' position seems sound. It is most un-
likely that the bank would agree to pay 4% interest unless it was
to have the free and unrestricted use of the money deposited;
and if it was to have that use, the transaction creates a debt and
"'SCOT ON TRUSTS, § 530.
"Powell Building & Loan Association v. Larabie Brothers Bankers, Inc.
8upra, note 3; Montana-Dakota Power Company v. Johnson, supra,
note 13.
1 0ZOLLMAN, BANKS & BANKING § 6591 (1936).
"7Raban v. Cascade Bank, 33 Mont. 413, 84 P. 72 (1906) ; Lasborn v. First
State Bank of Livingston, 75 Mont. 184, 243 P. 573 (1936) ; Pethybridge
v. First State Bank of Livingston, supra, note 13.
"101 Mont. 376, 54 P. (2d) 585 (1936).
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not a trust. Furthermore, there was no evidence to show that
the bank was intended to invest the money for the depositor and
guarantee him a return of 4%.
The Canley case seems to stand alone in reaching such a re-
sult; no other case has been found which is exactly in point. Two
cases from other jurisdictions appear to be similar but they are
distinguishable. In one case, the bank was to invest the deposited
funds and if it found it "impossible to secure the said four (4%)
per cent rate of compound interest" then it was to secure the
best rate of interest." In another case the depositor expressly
provided that the "said 'Fund' was to remain for a time undis-
turbed." The court found that the payment of interest was "not
for the use of the fund, but rather as a bargaining for a contribu-
tion from the banks of an annual rate of percentage of the in-
crease 'of the trust fund."'
It is quite common for an individual to deposit a check or
draft with a bank for collection and credit to his account or to
transmit to third parties. What the depositor is actually doing
in these cases is authorizing the bank to adopt its practice and
customs in the banking field.' The difficulty seems to be in
determining the relationship between the bank and the depositor
after the commercial paper has been collected. The presumption
is that the bank is entitled to use the money it collects as its own.
This presumption is capable of being rebutted by special agree-
ment or circumstances clearly indicating a different intention
prevailed.' Therefore, it is usually held that when commercial
paper is deposited for collection and remittance or collection and
deposit, and is endorsed in blank, or specially or restrictively for
collection, the bank is considered an agent up to the time the col-
lection has actually been made, and if there has been no collec-
tion the depositor is entitled to a preference in event of insolvency
of the bank.' However, as soon as the instrument is collected
the agency relationship is terminated and a debtor-creditor rela-
tionship is immediately established. This view was adopted by
the United States Supreme Court in Jennings v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co." in which Mr. Justice Cardozo stated:
"In the absence of tokens of a contrary intention,
"City of Canby v. Bank of Canby, 192 Minn. 571, 257 N.W. 520 (1934).
"OVillage of Montecello v. Citizens State Bank, 180 Minn. 418, 230 N.W.
889 (1930).
'Montana-Dakota Power Company v. Johnson, supra, note 13.
"Keyes v. Paducah & I. R. Co., 61 F (2d) 611, 86 A.L.R. 203 (1932).
"State v. Farmers' State Bank of Bridger, 54 Mont. 515, 172 P. 130
(1918) ; ScoTT ON TRUSTS, § 534.
"294 U.S. 216, 55 S. Ct. 394, 79 L. Ed. 869 (1935).
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the better doctrine is, where the common law prevails,
that the agency of the collecting bank is brought to an
end by the collection of the paper, the bank from then
on being in the position of a debtor, with liberty, like
debtors generally, to use the proceeds as its own."
The trend of recent cases is to follow the Supreme Court decision,
although there are jurisdictions holding contra.'
If the paper deposited with the bank is endorsed in blank,
some jurisdictions consider this as a sale to the bank, especially
if the bank credits the depositor's account and allows him to
draw on it. Since the bank is considered the purchaser, the
beneficial interest as well as the legal title is in the bank, and
in event of insolvency the depositor cannot get a preference."
This is contrary to the presumption that when matured or un-
matured negotiable paper is deposited for collection, the ben-
eficial interest is retained by the depositor until the paper is
collected, and the bank is acting as the agent or bailee of the de-
positor.'
In State v. Farmer's State Bank of Bridger" the depositor
gave the bank a certificate of deposit issued by another bank with
instructions to collect it when due and credit his account. The
bank discounted the certificate immediately and become insolvent
before the certificate matured. The court properly held that
since the certificate had not matured, the bank could not have
collected on it and it could not have credited the depositor's ac-
count. The bank violated its obligation to the depositor by dis-
counting it instead of waiting to collect it when it became due.
The principal-agency relationship which was established when
the certificate was left with the bank for collection was violated
and the bank became liable to the depositor.
The same principle applies between banks as it does between
a bank and its depositor. In State v. The Banking Corporatiane
the Stanton Bank sent its checks and drafts to the defendant
bank for collection. The agreement, evidenced by correspondence
between the two banks, was that the Stanton Bank was not to
draw on those checks until a sufficient time had elapsed to allow
the defendant bank to collect on the checks through its corre-
spondent banks. This agreement clearly showed that the defend-
25ScoTT oN TRusTs, § 534.
TGonyer v. Williams, 168 Cal. 452, 143 P. 736 (1914) ; Commercial Bank
& Trust Company v. Minshull, 137 Wash. 224, 242 P. 29 (1926). ScowT
oN TRUSTS, § 533.27State v. Farmers' State Bank of Bridger, supra, note 23.
'54 Mont. 515, 172 P. 130 (1918).
T7 4 Mont. 491, 241 P. 626 (1925).
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ant bank did not have the beneficial interest, but rather was con-
sidered as a trustee of the paper for the Stanton Bank. Like-
wise, the Stanton Bank was considered a trustee for the owners
of the checks who deposited them with the Stanton Bank. A
leading text writer in the field of Trusts calls this in substance
a trust and a sub-trust.m
In Montana it is not difficult to extend that principal-agency
relationship to cover the period after the commercial paper has
been collected. The court allowed a preference when a paper
was deposited with instructions "to collect it, and notify" the
depositor. The fact that the depositor had an open account with
the bank was of no weight in view of the specific instructions.
The court relied on the instruction "to collect it, and notify" to
find that the relationship of principal-agent had not been
changed to that of debtor-creditor. It is questionable whether
such an instruction, in view of banking customs and procedure,
is sufficient to constitute a "token of contrary intention" as
stated by Mr. Justice Cardozo. The case was correctly decided,
however, since the collecting bank becomes a debtor to the for-
warding bank which holds that claim in trust for the depositor.
If the paper is deposited for collection without any instruc-
tions, the debtor-creditor relationship is established after collec-
tion. The case of In re Liquidation of Columbus State Bank'
is a good illustration. The depositor had been a general depositor
with the defendant bank for 30 years and had been in the prac-
tice of buying commercial paper from the bank. When the
paper became due the bank would collect and credit the de-
positor's account and make out a deposit slip for the depositor.
The bank had just made a collection and issued a deposit slip,
but before it credited the account of the depositor it closed its
doors. No preferred claim was allowed. This case follows the
general trend in holding that the relationship of debtor-creditor
was established after the note had been collected. The fact that
the depositor did not tell the bank "to notify" him was perhaps
instrumental in the court's denying him a preference.
Several cases have been decided where the court held a de-
posit to be special in nature which, in reality, was a general de-
posit for a specific purpose. In the case of In re Gans & Kleine
it appeared that the bank suggested that the bankrupt conduct
a special sale of some of his property to raise money to pay
3ScoT ON TRUSTS, § 535.
t Guignon v. National Bank of Helena, 22 Mont. 140, 55 P. 1051 (1899).
'95 Mont. 332, 26 P. (2d) 643 (1933).
t 14 F. (2d) 116 (1936).
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pressing creditors with a view towards strengthening his credit
with them and thereby continuing his business; the fund realized
on the same was deposited in the defendant bank and the bank,
instead of allowing the bankrupt to pay his creditors as agreed,
attempted to claim the right of set-off against a debt due it from
the bankrupt. The court denied the right of set-off, holding
that the fund deposited was a special or specific deposit and such
deposits are "in the nature of a trust." The result is sound,
but not on the principle of a trust; the bank had the funds but
it was not required to pay the identical money deposited. The
bank was under a contractual agreement to pay an amount equal
to the deposit to the creditors of the bankrupt, and by attempting
a set-off it had breached its contract.
The case of Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Larabie Broth-
ers Bankers" is questionable. T~he treasurer of the company cus-
tomarily sent a draft accompanied by a letter to the bank desig-
nating the deposit "a special deposit for use in payment of this
company's paymaster's checks." The bank acknowledged re-
ceipt by letter stating "we have credited this account as a special
deposit. . . ." On insolvency, the court allowed the plaintiff a
preferred claim, holding it "clearly a special deposit by virtue
of an express agreement between the plaintiff and the bank, as
contained in the letters of transmittal by the plaintiff and the
letters acknowledging receipt thereof by the bank." The plain-
tiff did not have any beneficial interest in the deposit; he was
only interested in having a sufficient amount on hand to meet
the pay checks. This case appears to be a good example of what
Professor Scott had in mind in his work on Trusts :'
"So also the designation of the account as a 'special
account' does not usually indicate a special deposit, but
merely indicates that the deposit is not subject to with-
drawal by check in the ordinary way; or very often such
a designation is employed as a bookkeeping device en-
abling the depositor to keep separate accounts of his
separate activities."
Many similar cases are held to be general deposits, since the pre-
sumption is that money deposited with a bank is to be used by
the bank as its own, thereby establishing a debtor-creditor
relationship."
The following three cases are good examples of the weight the
Montana court gives to words expressed by the depositor. All of
"'103 Mont. 126, 61 P. (2d) 823 (1926).
"ScoTT oN TRUSTS, § 530.
"Id.
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these cases involved collection and transmission. In Hawaiian
Pineapple Co. v. Browne,.' the plaintiff sent a draft from Cali-
fornia to a Havre bank drawn on a Havre firm with instructions
to "collect and remit the proceeds." The firm paid the draft by
check drawn on the bank and the bank forwarded its draft to a
Chicago destination as requested. There was no transfer of
actual money; bookkeeping entries recorded the transfer. The
Havre bank became insolvent before the draft was paid and the
plaintiff was successful in getting a preference on his claim. The
court found that the principal-agent relation was established and
maintained even after the so-called collection because of the
instructions to "collect and remit." Considering that the entire
transaction involved merely a transfer of credits by the use of
bookkeeping entries and a draft, and that the plaintiff accepted
the draft mailed by the Havre bank, thereby ratifying the prac-
tice and customs of the bank, it appears that the instruction "to
collect and remit" is a narrow ground for holding the transac-
tion a special deposit.
Two years later the California Packing Corparatin v. Mc-
Clintock' case came before the Supreme Court of Montana under
facts identical to those of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. case except
that the plaintiff requested a collection and a draft forwarded
to the Wells-Fargo bank in San Francisco for the plaintiff's ac-
count. The plaintiff's claim, based upon the preceding case, was
disallowed. The court held that the instructions to collect and
send a draft was a direction not to send the identical money col-
lected, "but was equivalent to an agreement that the bank might
use the money collected and pay the plaintiff by its draft on the
San Francisco bank." The only difference between the Hawai-
ian Pineapple Co. case and the California Packing Corporation
case is that in the former the instructions were to "collect and
remit" whereas in the latter the instructions were to "collect
and send a draft." The court in the California Packing Cor-
poration case decided it in accord with the better view and the
trend of modern cases when it held:
"An agreement or understanding whereby the col-
lecting bank is to use the identical money collected and
substitute its own obligation in its stead destroys all
'69 Mont. 141, 220 P. 1114 (1922) ; See also Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Johnson, 99 Mont. 269, 43 P. (2d) 670 (1935), for a similar result where
the instructions were "to collect and remit proceeds in U.S. Current
funds."
'75 Mont. 72, 241 P. 1077 (1925).
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idea of a trust, and creates the relation of debtor and
creditor, instead of trustee and beneficiary."
Sometime later the case of Montana-Dakota Power Co. v.
Johnson' was decided in which the plaintiff was denied a pre-
ferred claim. The plaintiff employed a bank to collect its
power and light bills and to transmit the collections to the head
office in Williston by draft every third day. The bank kept a
record on the power company's "collection statements" and
mailed it to the plaintiff along with the draft. At first the bank
kept the funds in a cigar box but after a while it found it more
convenient to keep a "collection account" and did so without
notice to the plaintiff that it was doing so. The court relied
heavily on the banking customs to find a general deposit in this
case in spite of the fact that neither the bank nor the Power
Company intended that the plaintiff was to he an ordinary gen-
eral depositor. Some good law was applied in this case with re-
gard to the relationship of the bank after the collection was made
and also with regard to the "well-known custom of banks":
"... as a general rule, after the collection has been
made, the bank becomes a simple contract debtor for the
amount and does not hold the proceeds as agent in trust
for the depositor. If the party for whom the collection
is made is a depositor in the bank, the sum will be
placed to his credit, in the absence of special instruc-
tions on the subject, but the fact that the party contract-
ing for the collection is not a depositor does not alter
this rule, for if the party has no deposit account, the
bank simply owes him the amount on demand."
As to the banking custom, the court said:
"The 'well-known custom of banks' of which the courts
must take judicial notice, is to mingle money collected
with its general funds and remit by cashier's check or
draft on its general funds either in its own or another
bank. The party receiving the check or draft must be
deemed to have impliedly authorized the employment of
the custom and ratified it by the acceptance of such
paper; the deposit is general, and the relation that of
creditor and debtor, for the paper evidenced that the
other side of its bookkeeping transactions had taken
place, viz., that the sums had been deposited in its cash
as general deposits. "
It appears that in Montana if one wants to be sure of getting
a preferred claim or to have a transaction declared to be in the
'95 Mont. 16, 23 P. (2d) 956 (1933).
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nature of a trust, he should say this is "in trust," or he should in-
struct the bank "to collect and notify me" or to "collect and
remit" or notify the depository that "this is a special deposit."
Apparently, the court has accepted such instructions as indicat-
ing the intention of the parties, even though the transaction in
substance does not bear out the trust.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was intended
to safeguard deposits, and today it should not make any differ-
ence whether the deposit is general or special except in those
cases where the amount is over the $10,000 allowed by the insur-
ance. This insurance will reduce the number of cases consider-
ably, but there still may be a few cases which will involve more
than the insured amount. If such cases do come up, it is hoped
that a consistent policy will be followed by the court.
PAUL CASTOLDI.
WESTERN WATER RIGHTS:
MAY THEY BE TAKEN WITHOUT COMPENSATION?
In view of the fact that west of the 97th meridan, where
the climate varies from subhumid, to semi-arid, to arid with some
750,000,000 acres of arid lands of which only 21,000,000 are irri-
gated with streams incapable of supplying more than a fraction
of the water that could be beneficially used, and with annual
precipitation varying from twenty inches to less than five inches,
it is really apparent that water has come to mean everything, and
any existing property right in it has become invaluable.' Because
this is so, the time has now come when it is necessary to determine
to what extent rights in western water are recognized and to what
extent those recognized rights are protected in the individuals
owning them from the encroachment of the Federal government.'
One of the more important questions relating to the pro-
tection and recognition of such rights wherein the rights of in-
dividuals were asserted against the rights of the Federal Gov-
ernment was presented to the Supreme Court of the United
States in June, 1950.'
"'This condition of the arid region (west of the 97th meridian), and
the imperative necessity for irrigation to render it productive, is a mat-
ter of such common knowledge that the courts judicially take notice
that land within this region will not produce agricultural crops with-
out irrigation." 1 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS. p. 400. (2d.
ed. 1912).
2For a very able discussion of water law in Montana, see Heman, Water
Rights Under the Law of Montana, 10 MONT. L. REv. 13.
'U.S. v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 70 S.Ct. 955, 94 L. Ed. 1231(1950).
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